The Nuggets' performance in Game 2 was disappointing, despite Nikola Joki's 41 points and 11 rebounds. Denver's offense was lauded, but it was their defense that doomed them. The HEAT made 17 three-pointers and shot 48.9 percent from distance overall. According to the NBA's official tracking data, 11 of the 17 made three-pointers were classified as "open," as Denver botched numerous switches and miscommunicated on defense.

"I showed 17 clips this morning," head coach Michael Malone said following Game 2's loss. "Every clip was a discipline clip, if you will, where our discipline, whether it was the game plan, personnel, defending without fouling, or whatever it was 17

Denver clearly needs to improve its defense. An optimist might argue that the adjustments for Game 3 are relatively simple; just don't allow 40 points due to stupid mistakes. Communicate and be conceptually on the same page. Work together... as the Nuggets have done all postseason. According to NBA statistics, Denver had a strong playoff defense, ranking seventh. Allowing 129.1 points per 100 possessions in Game 2 is and was an outlier performance.

There are more takeaways to be had than simply cleaning up the defensive gaffes, but first, a look at the injury report.

Miami:

Bam Adebayo — Available (Right Shoulder Discomfort)

Tyler Herro — Out (Right Hand Surgery)

Victor Oladipo — Out (Left Knee Surgery)

Gabe Vincent — Available (Left Ankle Soreness)

Cody Zeller — Probable (Right Foot Sprain)

Can Denver keep Kevin Love on the bench?

Aaron Gordon, Denver's 6'8 and 203-pound powerhouse forward, scored 14 first-half points in Game 1 by repeatedly pounding Miami's starting lineup.

So, heading into Game 2, the HEAT made a big change and went bigger. At the starting power forward position, coach Erik Spoelstra replaced 6'5 Caleb Martin with 6'8 Kevin Love. Miami was a plus-18 in Love's minutes, who helped with rebounding and added much-needed physicality. With his excellent outlet passing, he frequently sparked Miami's fastbreak offense. Most importantly, he clogged the paint.

Love is not without flaws. He's 34 years old and has a wingspan of 6'11". He averaged just 0.6 blocks per game in his best season (2008-09). This season, that figure has dropped to just 0.2 rejections per game. He was never a particularly versatile defender, even in his prime. His ability to defend the perimeter has only deteriorated with age.

Despite this, Denver rarely exploited his defensive flaws in Game 2.

In the second game of the NBA Finals, Love was paired with Gordon for 6:01 total minutes. Gordon is a tough screener, making him an ideal candidate to set guard picks.

After Murray's explosive 26-point performance in the Finals opener, Spoelstra had Jimmy Butler defend Jamal Murray instead of Gabe Vincent in Game 2. Murray finished with 18 points on 7-of-15 shooting in Game 2, which was pedestrian by Murray's lofty standards.

On paper, it makes sense for Gordon to set pick-and-roll screens for Murray to get him away from Butler and into the mismatch against Love. Throughout their entire playoff run, Miami has been fairly fluid about switching on-ball screens, particularly between positions 1–4, and Gordon is the type of big-bodied screener who could force that switch.

Despite this, Denver did not use Gordon to screen for Murray once during the game on Sunday. Love was sitting there on a platter, ready to be served. But, alas, no.

The Nuggets did, however, have Gordon set a ball screen for Joki in their patented 5-4 pick-and-roll in the first quarter via an out-of-bounds set. Gordon's screen was low enough to force Miami to switch, giving Joki the easy floater over an ineffective contest with Love.

In Game 2, Denver never used that look again, with Gordon screening for Joki. It was the last time the Nuggets used Love in the pick-and-roll, which was presumably the best way to get him off the floor.

On a less serious note, Gordon can also simply barrel into Love, especially on the fastbreak. In general, Miami is excellent at limiting transition scoring, but having Gordon initiate the fastbreak is a great way to force rotations after misses. After driving into the chest of Love, Gordon was able to pull in help from Bam Adebayo, giving Joki a wide-open three.

It's in Denver's best interests to make Love unplayable. It will force Spoelstra to return to Martin and the small-ball lineup, allowing Denver to benefit from having significantly larger starters. To do so, however, the Nuggets must actually make Love uncomfortable defensively.

Should Denver make a minor tweak to its help defense?

Jimmy Butler's driving lanes have been prioritized by the Nuggets.

The strategy was successful, at least in terms of removing Butler from the series. He's scored 34 points in the Finals while shooting 39.4 percent from the field. Because Denver was able to smother the painted area, Miami only made two free throws in Game 1.

Spoelstra, one of the league's best coaches, adjusted in Game 2. In Game 1, Denver worked hard to stop drives in specific areas of the floor, particularly near the free-throw line (also known as the "nail"). As a result, Miami moved its shooters further away from the rim, making closeouts more difficult for the Nuggets.

Here's an example from Game 2 of what that looks like.

Butler assessed his right-wing opponent, Gordon. Kentavious Caldwell-Pope sunk down to the right elbow to take away the driving lane as he prepared to drive into the middle of the floor. Meanwhile, on the other side of the floor, KCP's man, Max Strus, repositioned himself 28 feet away from the rim. When Butler passed to Strus, Caldwell-Pope had too much ground to cover to get back to his original man, who swished home his fourth three-pointer of the game.

Here's an example from the third quarter.

Butler was sizing up Gordon at the right-wing once more. And, once again, Murray, the closest Nugget defender, sunk all the way down to the right elbow, while Strus was 28 feet away on the opposite side. Despite Murray's ability to recover, Strus attacked the closeout and got into the paint. This forced Joki to take a step away from his assignment, Adebayo, allowing for the bounce pass and bucket at the cup.

Throughout Denver's playoff run, Gordon has been an outstanding individual defender. In back-to-back games, he held Karl-Anthony Towns and Kevin Durant to 37 and 38 percent shooting, respectively. He's strong, disciplined, and stays down on pump-fakes, making him the ideal individual defender for Butler, who relies on craft and strength.

After finishing with four assists in Game 2, there was a lot of talk about "making Joki a scorer" by erasing his teammates. Maybe we're looking at that strategy from the wrong angle. Hugging Miami's shooters tight to avoid a three-point onslaught and allowing Gordon to defend Butler mano a mano without the aggressive help shown in the clips above is worth a shot.

Put Butler in as a scorer and see what happens.

Throughout this playoff run, Miami has either lived or died by the three. So, why not eliminate the three-ball entirely?

Is Denver's run a repeatable one?

Between the first and second quarters of Game 2, Denver went on a 40-14 run. Much of that run was led by the team's backups, including Jeff Green, Bruce Brown, and rookie Christian Braun, as well as Murray and Gordon.

With 6'8 Gordon in the middle, that unit is ideal for swapping matchups 1-5. Malone has been using that switching strategy since the end of the regular season, and it has largely worked.

As previously stated, Miami is a smaller team. They lack big men who can back down smaller defenders and own space near the rim.

They're the ideal opponent for going small against.

That is especially true when Butler is not on the floor, as he is Miami's only ball-handler who can consistently beat mismatches and force rotations.

When Butler sat early in the second quarter of Game 2, Miami's offense was completely flattened by going small and switching everything. It helps that Denver's backup unit features two of the team's best perimeter defenders, Braun and Brown, who both pressure opposing perimeter players and have extremely active hands.

Braun had two steals almost immediately after arriving. The Nuggets finished Game 2 with 18 fastbreak points, the majority of which came in the second quarter when their reserves increased their defensive intensity.

If Malone can get this kind of production from his backups, it raises Denver's ceiling for the rest of the series. Winning bench minutes in the NBA Finals was always going to be a major battleground.

TIME FOR GAME 3: Wednesday, 6:30 p.m. 92.5FM, ABC, and MT